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Military service has long been associated with citizenship, and blacks have been part of every 
American war since the founding of this nation. Five thousand fought in the Revolutionary War, 
180,000 fought in segregated units during the Civil War, and 380,000 enrolled in World War One.1 
Although black participation increased with each major conflict, only 42,000 of the blacks in World 
War One belonged to combat units, a result of 20th century racial tensions that turned opinion against 
the use of black soldiers.2 Segregation persisted within the military establishment, including military 
aviation, through World War Two. Within a span of ten years, however, the Army Air Corps moved 
from having no African Americans among its ranks to become the United States Air Force, boasting 
tens of thousands of African Americans serving in many specialty areas.3 This dramatic change was 
inspired in part by the actions of the people who trained at Tuskegee Army Airfield or who served in 
the units of the Tuskegee experiment, collectively known as the Tuskegee Airmen.4 Their 
demonstrated skill in combat operations, their direct action protests against segregation outside of 
combat, and their remarkable commitment to preservation of military efficiency and discipline 
despite prejudices in semi-integrated settings combined to undermine the foundational justifications 
of military segregation, paving the way for Executive Order 9981 and integration of the Air Force. 
Following World War One, the performance of black combat troops was questioned, 
prompting the Army to conduct various studies to determine how blacks could best be used during 
wartime. The most influential study was produced by the Army War College in 1925 titled “The Use 
of Negro Manpower in War.”5 The conclusions of this study were openly racist. They indicated that 
blacks had not evolved with the same progress as whites, and that black officers “not only lacked the 
                                                            
1 Charles C. Moskos Jr.,“The American Dilemma In Uniform: Race in the Armed Forces,” The Annals of 
the American Academy of Political and Social Science (March 1973) 95.; Stanley Sandler, Segregated 
Skies: All-Black Combat Squadrons in WWII (Washington, D.C.: Smithsonian Institution Press, 1992) 6. 
2 Sandler, Segregated Skies: All-Black Combat Squadrons in WWII 6. 
3 Alan L. Gropman, “Tuskegee Airmen,” Air Force Magazine (March 1996) 52,53. 
4 Alan Gropman, “In Recognition of Their Unique Record: Tuskegee Airmen Awarded the Congressional 
Gold Medal,” Air Power History (Summer 2007) 49. 
5 Alan L. Gropman, The Air Force Integrates, 1945-1964 (Washington, D.C.: Smithsonian Institution 
Press, 1998) 2. 
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mental capacity to command but courage as well.”6 As far as the Army was concerned, science 
supported their belief that the black man was mentally and morally inferior and thereby incapable of 
providing competent military leadership. Thus, the Army reasoned that continuing segregation was 
required based on the conclusions of such prejudiced studies. They considered the inferiority of the 
black soldier who had an “apparent lack of inherent natural mechanical adaptability” as evidence that 
technical positions, such as those in the Air Corps, would be a poor fit for black servicemen. 7 The 
War Department’s drafted plan for the utilization of black troops included provisions for blacks to be 
represented in the Army in proportion to their representation of military age citizens, to serve in 
segregated units, and to train and live in facilities that were separate from but equivalent to those for 
white troops.8  
The Army’s policy of racial segregation was based upon other assumptions as well. 
Segregation was assumed necessary because it conformed to prevailing social patterns. The War 
Department insisted it could not “solve national questions relating to the social or economic position 
of the various racial groups composing our Nation… and that it cannot act… contrary to the will of 
the majority of the citizens of the nation.”9 Indeed, an Office of War Information survey in 1943 
found that 90% of civilian whites and 18% of civilian blacks favored military racial segregation.10 
Commanding General of the U.S. Army Air Forces, Henry H. Arnold, feared an “impossible social 
problem” if black men were in command of white men.11 The Army and its Air Corps were not 
willing to advance integration ahead of public opinion. Another assumption was that military 
tradition dictated continuing segregation, and that experiments in integration would be detrimental. 
Army Chief of Staff General George C. Marshall summarized this thinking when he stated that “the 
                                                            
6 U.S. Army War College, “The Use of Negro Manpower in War,” 1925. 
7 Sandler, Segregated Skies: All-Black Combat Squadrons in WWII, 17.  
8 Ulysses Lee, The United States Army in World War II, Special Studies: The Employment of Negro 
Troops (Washington, D.C.: Officer of the Chief of Military History, 1996) 49, 50. 
9 Lee, The United States Army in World War II, Special Studies: The Employment of Negro Troops, 49. 
10 Sandler, Segregated Skies: All-Black Combat Squadrons in WWII, 18.  
11 Gropman, The Air Force Integrates, 1945-1964, 7.  
  3
existing policy of military racial segregation had proven satisfactory over a long period of years,” 
and that “experiments within the Army in the solution of social problems are fraught with danger to 
efficiency, discipline, and morale.”12 Thus, the War Department thought changing a traditional 
system presented grave and unwarranted risks in an environment of war mobilization.13 The Army’s 
final justifying assertion was that segregation itself did not constitute discrimination. This doctrine of 
“separate but equal,” established in Plessy v. Ferguson (1896), had been affirmed by more recent 
Supreme Court rulings and would not be struck down until the Brown v. Board of Education decision 
in 1954.14 These assumptions that justified segregation would crumble in the post-war years, 
prejudices exposed by the experiences and achievements of the Tuskegee Airmen.   
As the nation mobilized again for war, segregation would continue to be official Army 
policy; however, the conditions of WWII were critically different than WWI. President Franklin 
Delano Roosevelt needed the black vote to be reelected for an unprecedented third term, and Adolph 
Hitler’s belief in Aryan superiority created a moral dilemma that exposed the hypocrisy of 
segregation within a nation defending democracy.15 These realities provided black leaders with a 
foundation from which to advocate for civil rights. The ineffective and disappointing “close ranks” 
strategy of WWI which reasoned, “Let us, while this war lasts, forget our special grievances and 
close our ranks shoulder to shoulder with our own white fellow citizens and the allied nations that are 
fighting for democracy” was replaced by the “Double V” campaign of WWII, which advocated for 
victory over fascism in Europe and Jim Crow at home.16 Embracing this strategy, the press 
emphasized, “now is the time not to be silent about the breaches of democracy here in our own 
                                                            
12 Sandler, Segregated Skies: All-Black Combat Squadrons in WWII, 16, 17.  
13 Lee, The United States Army in World War II, Special Studies: The Employment of Negro Troops, 75. 
14 Dwight MacDonald, “The Novel Case of Winfred Lynn,” The Nation (February 20, 1943). 
Cites the cases Gaines v. Canada (1938), and Mitchell v. United States (1941) 
15 Michael F. Higginbotham, “Soldiers for Justice: The Role of the Tuskegee Airmen in the 
Desegregation of the American Armed Forces,” William & Mary Bill of Rights Journal (February 2000) 
279. 
16 “Close Ranks,” The Crisis (July 1918).  
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land…we must say that the fight against Hitlerism begins in Washington D.C.”17 Blacks knew their 
status would not change if they held a complacent silence, so they instead advocated for equality of 
opportunity, with one focus being on the Army Air Corps.18  
 The Air Corps was a prime target for blacks.  If they could gain access to military aviation, 
“they would reap immediate and widespread publicity—publicity that would prove that blacks could 
master the most complex and dangerous machinery.”19 The first significant opportunity for black 
aviators in the U.S. military came when the government opened the Civilian Pilot Training Program 
(CPTP) to blacks in the fall of 1939. Graduation from the CPTP program, however, did not provide 
black pilots the opportunity to enter the Air Corps. The Air Corps stated there was no provision made 
to create black Air Corps squadrons, so graduates could not be accepted into the ranks because there 
would be nowhere to place them.20 Integrating an existing squadron was clearly not considered. 
The demands of election politics in 1940 provided an environment ripe for activism. The 
black press stressed the political power blacks could wield by writing, “There will be a hard-fought 
Presidential election campaign within the twelve-month and our vote will be solicited.”21 President 
Roosevelt, understanding the importance of minority votes, won re-election after taking concrete 
action. In October, he announced that black aviation units would be formed, and a week prior to the 
election, African American Colonel Benjamin O. Davis was promoted to the rank of general and 
Harvard Law School graduate William H. Hastie was appointed as Negro Assistant to the Secretary 
of War.22 Civil Rights organizations, their legislative allies, and the black community continued to 
press the idea that segregation is unacceptable and hypocritical in a democratic nation claiming to 
fight in defense of freedom. Political advocacy was also accompanied by litigation that pushed for 
                                                            
17 “Now is the Time Not to Be Silent,” The Crisis (January 1942).  
18 Richard M. Dalfiume, Desegregation of the U.S. Armed Forces: Fighting on Two Fronts 1939-1953 
(Columbia: University of Missouri Press, 1969) 28.  
19 Sandler, Segregated Skies: All-Black Combat Squadrons in WWII, xiii.  
20 Gropman, The Air Force Integrates, 1945-1964, 5-6.  
21 “Fruits of Agitation,” Pittsburgh Courier (October 7, 1939) 10.  
22 Dalfiume, Desegregation of the U.S. Armed Forces: Fighting on Two Fronts 1939-1953, 41,42.  
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equal opportunity. In January 1941, Howard University student and CPTP graduate, Yancey 
Williams, filed suit against the War Department and Air Corps, claiming that he was denied 
admission based on his race.23 Perhaps the Air Corps was hastened by this action, as the formation of 
the first black combat unit was announced that same month and the lawsuit was dropped.24 Political 
expediency, legal action, and national press exposure successfully combined to create an initial and 
very real opportunity for blacks in the Air Corps.  
 The Tuskegee experiment, as it was dubbed by the Army Air Corps, was born of political 
necessity and activist pressure.25 The formation of the first black squadron was announced at a press 
conference on January 16, 1941 and was reported in the New York Times on January 17. The unit 
would include 33 pilots and 400 ground crew.26 The 99th Pursuit Squadron was activated on March 
22, 1941.27 This African-American combat unit would be trained near the Tuskegee Institute in 
Alabama, and by the summer of 1941, two fields were under construction: Moton Field for primary 
training and Tuskegee Army Air Field (TAAF) for combat training.28 The first class of students 
graduated the following March; they were Captain Benjamin O. Davis, Jr., and Lieutenants Lemuel 
R. Custis, George S. Roberts, Charles De Bow Jr., and Mac Ross.  
The establishment of this program in Tuskegee was criticized for its location in a southern 
town that was openly hostile to blacks.29 Heavy criticism of the segregated program also came from 
within the African American community. The Chicago Defender referred to it as “the Jim Crow air 
squadron” while The Pittsburgh Courier charged that it “perpetuates ‘the American way’ of racial 
                                                            
23 Todd J. Moye, Freedom Flyers: Tuskegee Airmen of World War II (New York: Oxford University 
Press, 2010) 37.; “Councils Back Suit of Yancey Williams to Enter Army Air Corps,” The Crisis (March 
1941).  
24 Sandler, Segregated Skies: All-Black Combat Squadrons in WWII, 19.  
25 Moye, Freedom Flyers: Tuskegee Airmen of World War II, 70.  
26 “Air Corps to Form a Negro Squadron: Plan Calls for 33 Officers and Ground Crew of 400,” The New 
York Times (January 17, 1941).  
27 Gropman, The Air Force Integrates, 1945-1964, 6.  
28 Sandler, Segregated Skies: All-Black Combat Squadrons in WWII, 27. 
29 Alan L. Gropman, “Tuskegee Airmen,” Air Force Magazine (March 1996) 53.  
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segregation.”30 William Hastie strongly criticized the segregated training program for its 
uneconomical and nonsensical duplication of facilities.31 These frustrations would eventually lead to 
Hastie’s resignation, and he declared “the racial impositions upon Negro personnel at Tuskegee have 
become so severe and demoralizing that, in my judgment, they jeopardize the entire future of the 
Negro in combat aviation.”32 Assistant aide, Truman Gibson, would replace Hastie in the War 
Department.              
 Competent and progressive leadership would prove crucial to the Tuskegee experiment and 
ultimately to the post-war integration of the Air Force. One of the most effective commanders at 
TAAF was Noel Parrish.33 Parrish took concrete steps to ease the burden of racial segregation 
introduced during the prior commander’s tenure.34 Parrish fostered professional relations with 
Tuskegee officials and students and assembled a group of professional white officers who were 
willing to complete their tasks regardless of race.  He uniquely understood that segregation was the 
prime cause of low morale among blacks.35 After the war, Parrish would be a strong advocate for the 
integration of the armed forces based on his lived experience at TAAF. Within the squadron, Captain 
Benjamin O. Davis, Jr., handpicked to be the leader of the first class of airmen at Tuskegee, was 
largely responsible for their success. 36 As commander of the 99th Pursuit Squadron and later the 
332nd, he emphasized the importance of mission and performance. In his autobiography, Davis states, 
“My own opinion was that blacks could overcome racist attitudes through achievement, even though 
those achievements had to take place within the hateful environment of segregation…The coming 
                                                            
30 “Negro Flyers,” The Chicago Defenders (March 29, 1941).; “Aviation: Perpetuating Segregation,” The 
Pittsburgh Courier, (March 29, 1941). 
31 Moye, Freedom Flyers: Tuskegee Airmen of World War II, 76.  
32 Sandler, Segregated Skies: All-Black Combat Squadrons in WWII, 75. 
33 Ibid., 34. 
34 Ibid.; Ibid., 39. 
35 Moye, Freedom Flyers: Tuskegee Airmen of World War II, 89, 90.; Sandler, Segregated Skies: All-
Black Combat Squadrons in WWII, 29.; Gropman, The Air Force Integrates, 1945-1964, 12.  
36 William Alexander Percy, “Jim Crow and Uncle Sam: The Tuskegee Flying Units and the U.S. Army 
Air Forces in Europe During World War II,” The Journal of Military History (July 2003) 778.; Moye, 
Freedom Flyers: Tuskegee Airmen of World War II, 59. 
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war represented a golden opportunity for blacks, one that could not be missed, and our future in the 
Air Corps would be determined by the account we gave of ourselves.”37  
 Training continued, and more positions were open for blacks at TAAF between 1942 and 
1943.   The 332nd Fighter Group was activated in October of 1942, comprised of the 100th and the 
301st and 302nd squadrons.38 The 99th squadron reached full strength in the summer of 1942 but had 
nowhere to go.  They continued to fly training missions while waiting for an overseas assignment. 
Pilot Clarence Jamison recalled, “We were good…we were over-trained…but, hell, nobody seemed 
to want us.”39 In the spring of 1943, the 99th finally deployed. The men of the 99th and later those in 
the 332nd Fighter Group were the only African American units in the Army Air Forces to see combat 
in WWII.40 
  The 99th moved from segregated training at Tuskegee to the semi-integrated reality of 
combat operations. They arrived in North Africa in April of 1943 and were assigned to the Twelfth 
Air Force.  With true segregation in air combat practically impossible, they were attached to a series 
of white fighter groups for tactical missions.41 Their first combat sorties occurred while attached to 
the 33rd Fighter Group, commanded by Colonel William Momyer, on the Mediterranean island of 
Pantelleria.42 Leadership, again, would prove crucial. Momyer’s attitude toward the 99th was one of 
professional indifference, and thus they were viewed “as a burden, an attachment the white pilots saw 
as a handicap rather than a responsibility.”43 In August, Momyer wrote a combat report criticizing the 
unsatisfactory and undisciplined performance of the 99th in the Pantelleria Campaign and proposed 
                                                            
37 Percy, “Jim Crow and Uncle Sam: The Tuskegee Flying Units and the U.S. Army Air Forces in Europe 
During World War II,” The Journal of Military History, 779.  
38 Sandler, Segregated Skies: All-Black Combat Squadrons in WWII, 89. 
39 Moye, Freedom Flyers: Tuskegee Airmen of World War II, 97. 
40 Daniel L. Haulman, “The Tuskegee Airmen in Combat,” Air Power History (Fall 2010) 16.  
41 Ibid.  
42 Moye, Freedom Flyers: Tuskegee Airmen of World War II, 99.  
43 Percy, “Jim Crow and Uncle Sam: The Tuskegee Flying Units and the U.S. Army Air Forces in Europe 
During World War II,” The Journal of Military History, 781.  
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the squadron be removed from combat.44 Time magazine published an article titled “Experiment 
Proved?” that stated, “Unofficial reports from the Mediterranean theater have suggested that the top 
air command was not altogether satisfied with the 99th’s performance.”45 Aware of the sensitive 
political nature of the experiment, Army Chief of Staff General Marshall requested a study of the 
issue prior to making a decision. The study contradicted Momyer’s claims and concluded there was 
“no significant general difference” between the performance of the 99th and other fighter units.46 
Additionally, Colonel Davis defended the 99th before the McCloy Committee, which was established 
in 1942 to address issues regarding the employment of black troops.47 Davis’ testimony and the 
study’s results gave reprieve to the 99th, allowing the experiment to continue. The 99th, and the future 
of black aviation, survived its most threatening challenge, one that came from high-ranking officers 
within Army Air Force itself. 48  
 The early combat experience of the 99th was characterized by bigotry and segregation. This 
changed in October 1943 when the 99th joined the 79th Fighter Group commanded by Colonel Earl 
Bates. Bates and the 79th, unlike the 33rd, welcomed the 99th and fostered a positive professional 
relationship with them, engaging in integrated training and combat missions.49 Even the Executive 
Director of the NAACP, Walter White, noted the unique attitude of this unit and stated, “The most 
remarkable development was the total obliteration of consciousness of difference in skin color among 
both white and black flyers of the 79th Group.”50 Integration with professional leadership yielded 
effective combat results. The 99th performed admirably and earned praise from Chief of the Allied 
Air Forces General Henry H. Arnold, one of the high command who had earlier questioned the unit’s 
                                                            
44 Moye, Freedom Flyers: Tuskegee Airmen of World War II, 102. 
45 “Experiment Proved?,” Time (September 20, 1943).  
46 Moye, Freedom Flyers: Tuskegee Airmen of World War II, 103. 
47 Gropman, The Air Force Integrates, 1945-1964, 27. 
48 Sandler, Segregated Skies: All-Black Combat Squadrons in WWII, 52.  
49 Percy, “Jim Crow and Uncle Sam: The Tuskegee Flying Units and the U.S. Army Air Forces in Europe 
During World War II,” The Journal of Military History, 789.  
50 Moye, Freedom Flyers: Tuskegee Airmen of World War II, 104. 
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ability to perform.51Times again reported on the 99th, but this time with affirmation: “These victories 
stamped the final seal of combat excellence on one of the most controversial outfits in the Army, the 
all-negro 99th Fighter Squadron…The Air Corps regards its experiment as proven.”52 The New York 
Times wrote “The Negro pilots of the 99th Fighter Squadron… more than proved their qualifications 
for aerial combat.”53 Here, the performance of the 99th shattered the myth that blacks lacked the 
technical ability to operate and maintain aircraft or that their combat performance would be inferior 
to whites.  The relationship between the 99th and the 79th proved that integration could be effective 
and beneficial when achieved under competent command leadership and that it neither threatened 
military efficiency or discipline nor created insurmountable social problems.   
 The 99th was attached to various other fighting groups before finally joining the all-black 
332nd Fighter Group at Rametelli Air Field.54 The 332nd, now commanded by Colonel Benjamin 
Davis, Jr., arrived in Europe in January 1944 with a primary mission of escorting heavy bombers for 
the Fifteenth Air Force. Davis’ leadership was again integral to the success of his unit. He impressed 
upon the men of the 332nd the imperative of their mission to provide fighter escort in protection of 
bomber crews.55 Davis understood the success of this mission was crucial not only for the war, but 
also for the future of black airmen.56 The 332nd performed admirably.  They received praise for their 
diligence, with one bomber pilot recalling, “Once established in their positions, the P-47s never left 
us” and a co-pilot stating, “Boy, we felt good when the Red Tails were with us.”57 The black press 
reported praise from the wing commander of a bomber group as “Your formation flying and escort 
                                                            
51 Art Carter, “99th Flyers Set Record with 9 Missions in Day: Pilots Strafe Enemy’s Front Lines in Italy,” 
Afro-American (December 25, 1943) 1.  
52 “Sweet Victories,” Time (February 14, 1944).  
53 “Negroes Praised As Air Fighters: 2 Aces, Back, Tell How Their Outfit Brought Down 17 Enemy 
Planes at Front,” New York Times (June 25, 1944) 13.  
54 Percy, “Jim Crow and Uncle Sam: The Tuskegee Flying Units and the U.S. Army Air Forces in Europe 
During World War II,” The Journal of Military History, 797.  
55 Ibid., 799.  
56 Ibid. 
57 Percy, “Jim Crow and Uncle Sam: The Tuskegee Flying Units and the U.S. Army Air Forces in Europe 
During World War II,” The Journal of Military History, 800, 802.  
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work is the best we have ever seen.”58 Again, segregation in actual combat flying was impossible as 
black fighter pilots provided protective escort to the white crews of bombers. With competent leaders 
modeling professionalism, the “experiment” again proved that military discipline and efficiency 
could survive integrated combat missions, and that black airmen were no less technically or 
mechanically capable than white ones.  
 The 332nd flew its last combat mission in April 1945, having amassed a good combat record 
that irreparably weakened the assertions underlying the Army’s policy of segregation. Of the 992 
pilots that graduated from the Tuskegee program, 450 served in combat and collectively flew more 
than 15,000 sorties.59 The War Department revealed that “when compared with other units in Italy,” 
the men of the 99th and 332nd “more than held its own in sorties, flying time, combat missions, and 
number of enemy aircraft destroyed.”60 The black pilots of the 332nd were neither worse nor better 
than white pilots, ending in roughly the same place as one another. However, when considering that 
black pilots and ground crew had far less experience in these specialties prior to the war than their 
white counterparts, it is fair to conclude that the Tuskegee Airmen came farther in less time.61 The 
unarguable record of satisfactory combat performance could not be ignored as the country would 
struggle with military integration after the war.          
 Air combat was not the only theater of operation in which the Tuskegee Airmen fought for 
equality. They acted outside of war to fight discrimination, and base recreational facilities were 
targets since community facilities, particularly in the South, were off limits to blacks. At Tuskegee in 
August 1944, black officers integrated the PX restaurant by eating lunch in the white section. The 
atmosphere was tense but not violent, and whites responded by abandoning the PX cafeteria in favor 
                                                            
58 Art Carter and Max Johnson, “5 Nazis Shot Down: Five Pilots Share Honors,” Afro-American (June 17, 
1944) 1.  
59 Moye, Freedom Flyers: Tuskegee Airmen of World War II, 39. 
60 Percy, “Jim Crow and Uncle Sam: The Tuskegee Flying Units and the U.S. Army Air Forces in Europe 
During World War II,” The Journal of Military History, 808. 
61 Haulman, “The Tuskegee Airmen in Combat,” Air Power History, 19.  
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of other dining options.62 Women at Tuskegee, such as Agatha Davis, Benjamin Davis Jr.’s wife, and 
Lieutenant Nora Green, a nurse at TAAF, also engaged in actions to protest discrimination. Agatha 
Davis organized “under-the-radar” boycotts of white merchants in town who mistreated blacks, while 
Lt. Nora Green was beaten and arrested for refusing to leave a whites only bus from Montgomery to 
Tuskegee.63 Elsewhere, the men of the 332nd were inflamed when they encountered a base theater 
with segregated sections at Fort Patrick Henry, Virginia. Colonel Davis addressed the issue with the 
base commander, and the segregating ropes came down giving blacks unrestricted access to the 
theater.64 Protests such as these demonstrated the commitment to integration by black military 
personnel, stressed that segregation was in no way acceptable or even tolerable, and made the armed 
forces a “critical battleground in the struggle for racial equality.”65 No protest would demonstrate the 
resolve of both advocates for and against integration as would that which occurred at Freeman Field.   
 The frustration of segregation and its detrimental effect on morale and military efficiency 
was exemplified by the experience of the 477th Bombardment Group. Activated in January 1944, the 
black 477th Bombardment Group was first located near Detroit at Selfridge Field, Michigan.66 
Training was slow and chaotic, and the group was moved many times, first to Godman Field, 
Kentucky supposedly to take advantage of “better atmospheric conditions for flying.”67 The black 
press questioned this transfer to “inadequate Dixie airfields” implying the move may have been 
racially motivated to discourage unrest. 68  The 477th was again moved in March 1945 to Freeman 
                                                            
62 Sandler, Segregated Skies: All-Black Combat Squadrons in WWII, 82.; Moye, Freedom Flyers: 
Tuskegee Airmen of World War II, 85. 
63 Moye, Freedom Flyers: Tuskegee Airmen of World War II, 59, 89. 
64 Sandler, Segregated Skies: All-Black Combat Squadrons in WWII, 92.  
65 Higginbotham, “Soldiers for Justice: The Role of the Tuskegee Airmen in the Desegregation of the 
American Armed Forces.” William & Mary Bill of Rights Journal, 313, 315.  
66 Gropman, The Air Force Integrates, 1945-1964, 15.; Moye, Freedom Flyers: Tuskegee Airmen of 
World War II, 106.  
67 Gropman, The Air Force Integrates, 1945-1964, 16.  
68 “Hit Northern Jim Crow; Airmen Shipped South,” The Chicago Defender (July 22, 1944).   
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Field in Indiana.69 The 477th was plagued by staffing problems, with no existing pool of trained black 
navigators or bombardiers.  Colonel Selway, Commander of the 477th and staunch segregationist, 
staffed the group with white leadership, leaving no opportunity for blacks to earn promotion or to 
gain command experience.70 Selway made this racially tense situation worse by creating separate 
officers’ clubs at Freeman Field.71 One club was reserved for instructors and the other for trainees; 
however, all whites were designated as instructors while all blacks were labeled trainees.72   
 These frustrations combined to create “an explosive situation” which led to the Freeman 
Field Mutiny.73 Negro officers of the 477th claimed the right to enter any officers’ club under the 
premise of Army Regulation 210-10, which outlawed segregated facilities.74 The Pittsburgh Courier 
brought national attention to the disgust felt by servicemen resulting from the “Freeman Field bias.”75 
In April 5, 1945 black officers acted. Over the next few days, they attempted to enter the white 
officers club in groups and were arrested. Fifty-eight of the sixty-one arrestees were released, the last 
three held for using force to enter the club.76 In response, Selway issued a new regulation and 
required officers to sign it confirming their understanding and acceptance.77 101 of the 422 black 
officers refused to sign and were arrested.78 National attention to this mutiny brought pressure from 
Truman Gibson, the McCloy Committee, the NAACP, and the Chicago Urban League, resulting in 
General Marshall ordering release of the 101 officers and reassigning Benjamin Davis, Jr. to 
command the 477th.79 Ultimately, only one of the three black officers tried for using force to enter the 
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club was found guilty.80 With leadership focused more on segregated facilities than training, the 477th 
did not achieve combat readiness before the war ended.81 The War Department strengthened the ban 
on segregated facilities, including officers’ clubs, as outlined in Army Regulation 210-10.82 The 
actions of the black officers at Freeman Field in response to oppressive segregation “forced the War 
Department to define racial segregation as a discriminatory act by definition.”83 With the recognition 
that segregation was discrimination, another assertion justifying military segregation was shaken.  
 The Tuskegee Army Air Field closed in early 1946. The 99th Fighter Squadron and the 332nd 
Group were consolidated to become the 477th Composite Group, ultimately re-designated the 332nd 
Fighter Wing.84 With demobilization, the problems and inefficiencies of segregation within the Army 
Air Forces became glaring. The all-black Fighter Wing continued to have staffing issues resulting 
from Jim Crow policies, and they became ineffective.85 Ongoing race-based restrictions were 
reported in the Pittsburgh Courier as “proof that the U.S. Army is the same biased arm of pre-World 
War II days.”86 However, the war for democracy abroad had forced debates on the morality of 
segregation within the armed services, and continuing the racial status quo was clearly unfeasible. 
General Benjamin Davis effectively captured this in a 1946 speech, “Many of the half-million 
colored men and women who have served abroad have…experienced a freedom abroad not 
experienced in their homes here in the U.S. These people will never forget this freedom, and it is not 
going to be an easy task to compel them to get back into the old pattern.”87 Change was inevitable, 
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due in part to the actions and accomplishments of the Tuskegee Airmen within and outside of combat 
which exposed the burden and inefficiencies of segregated Army Air Force service.   
 Post war, the Army again studied the use of blacks, including the performance of the 
Tuskegee Airmen.88 The memorandum “Participation of Negro Troops in the Postwar Military 
Establishment” included findings that black airmen “performed creditably” and that “given proper 
selection of personnel and training, there is no evidence that the Negro cannot do a satisfactory 
specialized job whether administrative or technical.”89 However, the recommendation was for 
segregation to continue. Noel Parrish, the Tuskegee Army Air Field commander, offered a different 
opinion.90 Parrish recommended the “employment and treatment of Negroes as individuals which the 
war requires and which military efficiency demands” and went on to conclude that “segregation is 
itself inconsistent and contradictory.”91 The Gillem Board, tasked with developing a new policy for 
blacks in the armed services, took this information and issued its own report in 1946.92 Its 
recommendation for gradual integration of forces during duty hours was largely ignored.93 
Unchanged attitudes within the leadership of the Army Air Forces yielded little movement among 
military leaders toward integration in the early post-war years.      
 While the Army made no moves toward integration, civilian political leaders acted 
differently. Two events in the post-war years hastened the Army Air Forces along the path to 
integration. First, President Truman appointed the President’s Committee on Civil Rights in 
December 1946 to study the Federal Government’s authority in civil rights issues, and their findings 
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would lay the groundwork for Executive Order 9981.94 Second, the independent U.S. Air Force was 
created in 1947.95 The President’s Committee on Civil Rights issued its landmark report in October 
1947, referencing the war as it contradicted earlier arguments against integration by noting, “The war 
experience brought to our attention a laboratory in which we may prove that the majority and 
minorities of our population can train and work and fight side by side in cooperation and harmony.”96 
Although not mentioned specifically, the black airmen trained in the laboratory of the Tuskegee 
experiment at TAAF had proven this potential for cooperation and harmonious relations in combat. 
In presenting the report’s recommendations to Congress in February 1948, Truman concluded by 
saying, “I have instructed the Secretary of Defense to take steps to have the remaining instances of 
discrimination in the armed services eliminated as rapidly as possible.”97 Integration of all the armed 
services would happen soon. 
 The upcoming election would expedite executive action.  Activists exerted political pressure 
which, combined with Russian Cold War propaganda and political discord within the Democratic 
Party, forced issuance of the anticipated executive order. Executive Order 9981, issued July 26, 1948, 
called for “equality of treatment and opportunity for all persons in the armed services without regard 
to race, color, religion, or national origin.”98 The move was hailed on the front page of the Pittsburgh 
Courier, “President Truman Takes Steps to Abolish Jim Crow In Armed Services.”99 Implementation 
of this order would be overseen by the President’s Committee on Equality of Treatment and 
Opportunity in the Armed Forces, known as the Fahy Committee.100 The Federal Government had 
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clearly established its support for a policy of integration, and it would be up to the military to follow 
along in compliance.  
 The Army Air Corps, adamantly opposed to integration before the war, became the 
independent U.S. Air Force and thus one of the first institutions to end segregation after the war.101 
Desegregation happened primarily for practical and operational efficiencies, as Colonel Parrish had 
identified “segregation prevents standardized personnel procedures.”102 Having realized the 
intolerable inefficiency of racial segregation through the experiences of the 99th, 332nd, and 477th, the 
newly established United States Air Force began planning a policy of integration soon after its 
inception.103 Executive Order 9981 set the policy into action. As a new service, the Air Force did not 
have the intransigent barrier of military tradition to overcome in establishing policies.104 New 
leadership also hastened change. The first Secretary of the Air Force, Stuart Symington, was a strong 
advocate for desegregation based on military efficiency, Cold War ideology, and morality.105 His 
service’s policy for integration reached the Secretary of Defense by December 1948 and was 
presented to the Fahy Committee in January 1949.106 Speaking clearly in military terms, Secretary 
Symington explained integration by saying, “The Commander-in-Chief said that this should be done 
and so we did it.”107 Unhindered by military tradition, the Air Force nearly completed integration 
before the Army began.108 Within six months of the policy’s May 1949 implementation, the Air 
Force had created 1,301 integrated units with only 59 black units remaining.109 The airmen of the 
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332nd were integrated into other squadrons, and the Wing was officially deactivated in June 1949.110 
By June 1952 there were no more all-black units in the Air Force.111 Since integration, there has been 
a substantial increase in the proportion of blacks serving in the Air Force, from less than five percent 
in 1949 to twenty-two percent in 2014.112  
 Reform in the Army Air Forces began in 1942 with the first class of five men at Tuskegee 
Army Air Field. Their actions and those of the 987 pilots who followed them weakened the 
foundation on which the Army’s policy of segregation was based. Their combat successes clearly 
showed no inherent inferiority for technical matters or complex assignments, and their performance 
in integrated situations did not reflect an “impossible social problem.” They showed that the Army 
Air Corps was a viable laboratory in which to conduct an experiment. The moral courage displayed 
by airmen outside of combat through protests belied the contention that segregation was not 
discrimination. What these men achieved despite entrenched prejudice and bigotry is remarkable. 
The Congressional Gold Medal award, conferred in 2007, states, “The Tuskegee Airmen inspired 
revolutionary reform in the Armed Forces, paving the way for full racial integration in the Armed 
Forces. They overcame the enormous challenges of prejudice and discrimination, succeeding, despite 
obstacles that threatened failure.”113 They set an example that undermined the foundations of 
segregation, one that could not be ignored.        
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